FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS

HILARY TERM 2018

The Philosophy Centre is found at the Radcliffe Humanities Building, on Woodstock Road, which is also the site of the Philosophy and Theology Faculties Library.

NOTES:

- "CL" means the lecture is a Core Lecture for one of the Honour Schools papers.

- The normal duration of an event is one hour. Where the class or lecture lasts longer than an hour, the start time and end time will be given.

- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.

- Lectures and classes begin at five minutes past the hour, and end five minutes before. (E.g: a lecture listed as "M. 10" will start on Mondays at 10.05am, and finish at 10.55am.)

- Students registered on Philosophy courses, and Faculty members, will need their University card to enter the Philosophy Centre at Radcliffe Humanities. Visitors should use the intercom on the front door to ask for access.

- There are several rooms used as lecture/class spaces at Radcliffe Humanities. The main rooms are: the Ryle Room (1st floor), the Lecture Room (2nd floor), and the Seminar Room (3rd floor). Other rooms sometimes used are the Colin Matthew Room (ground floor) and Meeting Room 4 (ground floor).

- There is lift and stair access to all floors. A list of rooms is found by the stairwell and lift on each floor.

- "Schools" refers to the Examination Schools (75 – 81 High Street), one of the main lecturing facilities in the University. If you visit the Schools for a lecture or class, please be sure to check the electronic notice boards in the lobby, which will tell you which room the lecture/class is in.

- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

Lectures for the First Public Examination

Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term:

PPE, Philosophy and Modern Languages, Philosophy and Theology, Psychology and Philosophy: Moral Philosophy, and General Philosophy

Mathematics and Philosophy, Physics and Philosophy, Computer Science and Philosophy: Elements of Deductive Logic, and General Philosophy; Turing on Computability and Intelligence (CSP only)

Literae Humaniores: any listed Prelims/Mods lecture that corresponds to their chosen Philosophy option for Mods

General Philosophy
Prof Alexander Kaiserman – W. 12, Schools

These lectures will cover the topics set out in the General Philosophy Syllabus: Knowledge and Scepticism, Induction, Mind and Body, Personal Identity, Free Will, and God and Evil.

Moral Philosophy: Mill, *Utilitarianism*
Prof William Mander – F. 12, Schools

Lecture 1   Introductory remarks
Lecture 2   Ethics of action vs ethics of character / Consequentialism vs deontology
Lecture 3   Subjective vs objective accounts of wellbeing / hedonism
Lecture 4   Higher & lower pleasures
Lecture 5   Objections to utilitarianism (i)
Lecture 6   Objections to utilitarianism (ii)
Lecture 7   Proof & sanctions
Lecture 8   Justice

Elements of Deductive Logic
Prof Alex Paseau – T. 12, Maths Institute (L5*; weeks 6 to 8* C1)

Elements of Deductive Logic builds on last term's Introduction to Logic lectures. It is aimed at students sitting Prelims in Mathematics & Philosophy, Physics & Philosophy, and Computer Science & Philosophy. The only set text is Halbach's *Logic Manual*, knowledge of which will be assumed. The course content is primarily metalogical and the focus will be heavily on truth-functional metalogic, with some discussion of quantified metalogic toward the end.

Lectures for the Honour Schools

Lectures listed in this section are **core lectures** for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. It is therefore very much in your interest if you are a finalist to attend as many relevant core lectures as your schedule permits.

Students should also refer to the section *Other Lectures*, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but sometimes cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: topics in metaphysics across the period
Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra – T. 11, Schools

In these lectures I will discuss the notion of substance in Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. I will also consider some of the consequences of the notion of substance in those authors, for instance its consequences with respect to mind-body causation and whether matter can think.

102 Knowledge and Reality: Epistemology
Prof John Gibbons – W. 10, Schools

These lectures will focus on some of the core topics in epistemology, in particular the nature of knowledge including reliability, safety, and sensitivity and the nature of justification including coherentism, foundationalism, internalism, and externalism.

103 Ethics I: Normative Ethics
Dr Cressida Gaukroger – Th. 10, Schools

These lectures will examine what makes people and their actions morally good or bad. They will present a range of ethical theories including Consequentialism, Deontology, Virtue Ethics, and Feminist Ethics, and look at their implications, advantages and potential flaws or challenges. We will consider questions such as: Is it our actions, motives, or character that make us good? How much does morality demand of us? Is doing harm worse than allowing harm? Is equality an intrinsic good, or is it only good insofar as it promotes happiness?

103 Ethics II: Metaethics
Prof Guy Kahane – F. 10, Schools

The introductory lectures will cover key concepts, theories and debates in metaethics. They are intended for undergraduates taking the Ethics 103 paper. We will be concerned with metaethical questions such as the following: *What is the nature of moral judgements? Are there moral facts? If so, what kind of fact are they? Can we have moral knowledge? What is the relation between moral judgment and emotion and motivation?* The first lecture will offer a map of the terrain and introduce the main rival theories. We will consider criteria for choosing between these competing theories and ask whether and why metaethics matters. The second lecture will examine G. E. Moore's open question argument, which shaped much of the debate in 20th century metaethics, and introduce the debate between naturalist and non-naturalist approaches to metaethics. The subsequent lectures will then critically consider the main metaethical positions: non-naturalist moral realism, the error theory, naturalist moral realism, subjectivist and constructivist views, and noncognitivism in its different variants.

103 / 128 Ethics III: Applied Ethics / Practical Ethics
Prof Mari Mikkola – T. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are intended primarily for students taking papers 128 and 103, though anyone interested is welcome to attend. The lectures will address a number of topics central to practical ethics. The topics covered provisionally include: abortion, surrogacy, sex work, consent, racial profiling, affirmative action, and death.

104 Philosophy of Mind
Dr Umut Baysan – M. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will discuss four problems that contemporary philosophers of mind address: (i) the problem of consciousness; (ii) the problem of mental causation; (iii) the problem of mental content; (iv) the problem of perception. First, we will introduce the general physicalist/naturalist framework in which these problems are typically presented, focusing on the mind-body supervenience thesis. Then, we will discuss the problem of consciousness, introducing varieties of consciousness and focusing on theories of phenomenal consciousness, the knowledge argument against physicalism about qualia, and the so-called "explanatory gap". Then we will move on to the problem of mental causation, addressing views such as anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism, and discussing the causal closure and the causal exclusion arguments. These will take us to the problem of mental content, where we will explore various theories of mental content and focus on the externalism-internalism debate. We will conclude by discussing the problem of perception, where we will focus on the argument from illusion/hallucination.

Most introductory texts in philosophy of mind cover these topics, but some particularly helpful ones are Jaegwon Kim's *Philosophy of Mind: 3rd edition* (Westview Press, 2011)

(though the 2nd edition is equally good), David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson's *The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: 2nd edition* (Blackwell, 2007), E. J. Lowe's *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (CUP, 2000) and Pete Mandik's *This is Philosophy of Mind* (Wiley Blackwell, 2014). We will also work with some of the original articles that these texts discuss, most of which are either collected in anthologies such as John Heil's *Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology* (OUP, 2004), or otherwise available online.

107 Philosophy of Religion
Prof Brian Leftow – F. 12, Schools

This course is an overview of some main problems and arguments in the philosophy of religion. The latter is almost always the philosophy of some specific religion: in this course, the religion is Christianity. But the problems are discussed at a sufficiently general level that almost all I have to say could be accepted by Jews or Muslims as well.

The first four weeks are spent explaining some of the main claims the Western monotheisms make about God's nature - that He is bodiless, a creator *ex nihilo*, eternal, a necessary being, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect. I indicate some problems in understanding each claim and suggest ways to resolve them. The next four weeks take up the case for and against God's existence. I discuss the problem the existence of evil poses for belief that God exists, and the three main sorts of arguments in favour of God's existence - design, 'cosmological', and 'ontological'. I suggest that the problem of evil can be met. Some 'ontological' arguments, I show, make it plausible that if it is so much as possible that God exists, then He really does. I also suggest that there is some reason to think it possible that God exists.

108 Philosophy of Logic and Language
Dr Jonny McIntosh – Th. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will offer an introduction to various topics in the philosophy of logic, taking Alfred Tarski's work on truth as a starting point. Subsequent lectures will introduce the following topics: logical consequence, logical constants, Kripke's theory of truth, the liar paradox, logical revision, logical pluralism, and the relationship between logic and reasoning. Note that these lectures are designed to complement Professor Paul Elbourne's lectures for this paper next term, which focus on topics in the philosophy of language.

112 Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason*
Prof Anil Gomes – F. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will provide an introduction to Immanuel Kant's theoretical philosophy through an examination of some of the topics arising from his *Critique of Pure Reason*. They are primarily intended for those taking the Philosophy of Kant paper (112), but anyone who is interested in the material is welcome to attend. We will cover, amongst other topics, the

nature of Kant's critical project; space and time in the first Critique; the Transcendental Deduction; the rejection of transcendent metaphysics; transcendental idealism. Our primary aim will be to try and get an overall sense of Kant's work in theoretical philosophy, partly as a way of understanding why it has exerted such influence and why it continues to attract such fascination. Details of translations and other readings can be found on the Faculty Reading list.

115 /130 Plato: *Republic*
Prof Dominic Scott – M. 10, Schools

The *Republic* is one of Plato's most famous and influential works. The dialogue is prompted by questions about the nature of justice and the best possible kind of life we can live. These questions lead to wide-ranging discussions of the ideal city, virtue and vice, the nature of knowledge and reality, the nature and immortality of the soul, moral psychology, education, and the arts. The study of the *Republic* will thus introduce you to many of Plato's central ideas and arguments.

These lectures are primarily intended for students taking papers 115/130 in any of the Honour Schools, but anyone with an interest in Plato and the history of philosophy is welcome to attend. (Knowledge of ancient Greek is not required.) Last term, Prof. Castagnoli gave eight lectures on books 1-5 of the *Republic.* This term Prof. Scott will do the same for the second half of the work, looking at a selection of key passages, topics and arguments in books 6-10. The aim will be to identify and discuss some of the main exegetical and philosophical questions that might be raised.

The following is a provisional guide to the topics to be covered in Hilary Term:

1. [a] Introduction to the second half of the *Republic*; [b] the defence of philosopher rulers in book VI
2. The images of the sun, line, and cave
3. Mathematics and dialectic in books VI-VII
4. The theory of education in books VI-VII
5. The account of degenerate constitutions in book VIII, including the critique of democracy
6. The analysis of tyranny in book IX and its importance to the *Republic* as a whole
7. The critique of the arts in book X
8. Overview of the defence of justice in the *Republic* as a whole

116 / 132 Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*
Prof Simon Shogry – T. W. 12, Schools

These lectures are designed for undergraduates taking the *Nicomachean Ethics* paper in translation or in Greek, but other interested parties are welcome to attend. It will be useful to bring a copy of the NE to each session. In the sixteen lectures this term, we will cover material from the entire treatise (books I-X), focusing on: Aristotle's conception of happiness, the function argument, the doctrine of the mean and virtues of character, Aristotle's theory of voluntary action and moral responsibility, decision and deliberation, justice, prudence, continence and incontinence, friendship, pleasure, and the role of contemplation in the happiest life.

120 Intermediate Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics
Dr Owen Maroney – M. T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This will be a sixteen lecture course looking in detail at the central conceptual problems of quantum theory. While the application of the mathematical structure of quantum theory has been unambiguously successful, having predictive and explanatory success across vast range of phenomena, there is little consensus on its physical interpretation. The course will have a particular focus upon clearly distinguishing the operational content of the theory from the properties of physical models that have been proposed to account for quantum phenomena.

Topic to be covered include, but may not be limited to:

 - The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, including quantum uncertainty, mixed states and decoherence;

 - The phenomena of quantum interference and entanglement and why these raise problems for simple attempts to physically interpret the formalism;

 - The measurement problem, and the principle interpretative responses to it;

 - A more detailed examination of the advantages and weaknesses of the dynamical collapse and the hidden variable programs, with use of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber and de Broglie-Bohm theories as exemplars;

 - The problem of quantum non-locality, including the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Bell's theorem.

 The lectures are primarily aimed at 3rd year undergraduates studying Physics & Philosophy, and at graduate students studying the MSt in Philosophy of Physics. Others are welcome, but some familiarity with quantum mechanics and its mathematical framework will be assumed.

121 Advanced Philosophy of Physics

Prof Adam Caulton, Dr Owen Maroney, Dr Christopher Timpson – Th. 11 – 1, Brasenose College (Platnauer Room)

Please see the entry for the graduate class on Philosophy of Physics, below.

125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Dr Cressida Gaukroger and Dr Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper – T. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course consists of eight core lectures primarily intended for students taking Philosophy of Cognitive Science for examination in 2018. Note that lectures normally last for approximately one hour with time at the end for informal discussion.

Topics that will be covered include:

Psychological vs. Folk-Psychological Explanation.
The language of thought and the computational theory of mind
Connectionist models of cognitive processing
The scientific study of consciousness
Unconscious Perception

This course will also investigate the nature of concepts and the question of whether concepts, thoughts and psychological capacities are innate or the product of nurture and environment.

Useful Background Reading:

Clark, A. 2001: *Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crane, T. 2003: *The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representations* (Second Edition). London: Routledge.

Stone, T. and Davies, M. 2012: Theoretical issues in cognitive psychology. In N. Braisby and A. Gellatly (eds), *Cognitive Psychology* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 639–79.

127 Philosophical Logic
Prof James Studd – W. 12 (*all weeks*) and Th. 12 (*weeks 1 and 2)*, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These are the core lectures for students taking FHS Paper 127. But they may also be of interest to others who want to learn about the technical details and philosophical applications of extensions to (and deviations from) classical logic.

There will also be two additional lectures in weeks 1 and 2. These deal with the mathematical methods used in the course, and are primarily aimed at students who did not take the second logic paper, Elements of Deductive Logic, for Prelims.

The paper is studied in conjunction with a set textbook, Theodore Sider's *Logic for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press). I recommend that you read the indicated sections of the book before attending the lecture each week.

The schedule for the main series of lectures is as follows:

Week 1. Classical propositional logic, variations, and deviations
LfP 2.1–2.4 (2.5 non-examinable), 3.1–3.4 (3.5 non-examinable)
Review of syntax and classical semantics for PL; three-valued semantics; supervaluationism

Week 2. Modal propositional logic: semantics
LfP 6.1–6.3, 7.1–7.3 (7.4 non-examinable)
Syntax of MPL; Kripke semantics for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5. Deontic, epistemic and tense logic.

Week 3. Modal propositional logic: proof theory
LfP 2.6, 2.8, 6.4
Axiomatic proofs for PL. Axiomatic proofs for K, D, T, B, S4 and S5.

Week 4. Modal propositional logic: metatheory
LfP 2.7, 6.5 (Proofs in 2.9, 6.6 non-examinable)
Soundness and Completeness for MPL. (Proof of completeness is non-examinable).

Week 5. Classical predicate logic, extensions, and deviations.
LfP 4, 5
Review of the syntax and classical semantics of PC. Extensions of PC. Free logic.

Week 6. Quantified modal logic: constant domains
LfP 9.1–9.5, 9.7
Semantics and proof theory for SQML.

Week 7. Quantified modal logic: variable domains, 2D semantics
LfP 9.6, 10
Kripke semantics for variable domain K, D, T, B, S4, and S5. Two-dimensional semantics for @, X and F.

Week 8. Counterfactuals.
LfP 8
Stalnaker's and Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals.

Lecture notes and problem sheets will be posted on the course webpage:
https://jamesstudd.net/phillogic/

Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
Dr Sophie Allen – M. 12, Schools

This course introduces you to some general topics in the philosophy of science. What is science and can we distinguish science from other forms of enquiry? What are scientific theories about? Do scientists discover what there is in the world, or are scientific theories tools with which we predict and explain? Is there a scientific method, and what does it involve? How are scientific theories, models or hypotheses confirmed or rejected? What is the relationship between evidence and theory? Does science make progress? And if so, how does it progress? Is scientific enquiry free from social and cultural influences?

These lectures will not presuppose any prior study of philosophy. They support the options of *History and Philosophy of Science*, available in some Honour Schools in the natural sciences subjects, and the supplementary subject *Philosophy of Science* in the Honour School of Physics. Students considering taking these options are encouraged to come along.

Students should initially approach philosophy tutors in their own colleges in order to arrange tutorial teaching for this course (or ask their own subject tutors to do this for them), although there may also be the possibility of arranging some tutorial teaching at the lectures.

Interested students are referred to past papers on OXAM for some idea of what is covered (search on paper code, using the search term "S00004W1").

Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences)

The 2018 Isaiah Berlin Lectures: *Political Theology: A Risky Subject in History*
Prof György Geréby (Central European University) – W. 5 (*weeks 1 to 5*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The Faculty is delighted to welcome the 2018 Isaiah Berlin lecturer, Prof György Geréby.

17 Jan: 'Alexander's legacy. The Hellenistic justification of monarchy'
24 Jan: 'Theocracy and the Kingdom of God. Biblical and early Christian polities'
31 Jan: 'Christianity for and against the empire. Eusebius or Augustine?'
7 Feb: '"No church without an emperor." The Byzantine symphony'
14 Feb: 'Two swords and two luminaries. The conflict in the Latin West'

After the first lecture, there will be a reception for Prof Geréby in the Ryle Room, to which all are welcome.

Conditionals and Plurality
Dr Matt Mandelkern – Th. 4.30 – 6.30 (*weeks 1 to 4*) and 5 – 7 (*weeks 5 to 8*), All Souls College (Hovenden Room)

This will be a graduate research seminar in philosophy of language. We will focus on the semantics of conditionals—sentences of the form 'If p, then q'—with particular attention to the question of the validity of conditional excluded middle, the principle which says that 'If p, then q, or if p, then not q' is a theorem. After some background reviewing classic work on the semantics of conditionals and conditional excluded middle, we will explore more recent work connecting the semantics of conditionals with the semantics of plurality in general. A tentative plan for the course is as follows: in weeks 1 and 2, we will cover classic work by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Kratzer on the semantics of conditionals. In weeks 2 and 3, we will focus on conditional excluded middle in particular, discussing the controversy between Lewis and Stalnaker over the principle, and looking at more recent work by Higginbotham and von Fintel and Iatridou on the empirical situation. In weeks 4 and 5 we will begin to explore the link between plurality and conditionals, looking at work by von Fintel and Schlenker. In week 5 we will read sections of Križ's dissertation on homogeneity in the analysis of plurality in general and conditionals in particular. In week 6, Dr Križ will present current work on these topics.

Weeks 7 and 8 are left open; our choice of topic will depend on the interests of course participants. Options include exploration of connections between homogeneity and free choice in conditionals; issues related to the probabilities of conditionals; truth-maker semantics for the conditional; further exploration of the logic of conditionals; and connections between generic conditionals and bare plurals.

An up-to-date syllabus and links to readings will be posted at users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0776/cp.html. Those wishing to attend the first session may want to familiarize themselves with Stalnaker 1968, 'A theory of conditionals', and Chapter 1 of Lewis 1973, *Counterfactuals*, both available on the course website, which will be the topic of discussion in the first session.

Key topics in moral psychology
Mr Carl Hildebrand – W. 11 (*weeks 5 to 8*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

This course will focus on topics from the finals paper in ethics which fall under the category of moral psychology, broadly construed. The topic covered in each of the four lectures will be: (1) moral motivation; (2) moral character; (3) weakness of will; (4) guilt, shame, and conscience.

Lecture (1) will look at Humean and anti-Humean approaches to moral motivation, briefly considering Hume and Kant as important historical figures in this debate before turning to contemporary authors who have advanced the debate. Lecture (2) will briefly outline Aristotle's account of the virtues from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, discussing both the nature of the virtues and their relation to the good life. It will outline several recent arguments against utilitarian and Kantian ethics that are motivated by a desire to obtain a right understanding of moral character and its relation to the good life, then discuss several possible replies a utilitarian or Kantian might make to these objections. Lecture (3) will cover the phenomenon understood as weakness of will. This will include a brief look at Socrates and Aristotle's accounts, discussing what each implies concerning the relation between desire, the will, and practical rationality. This will be followed by a more detailed outline of R.M. Hare, Donald Davidson, and Richard Holton's more recent accounts. Lecture (4) will look at guilt and shame in relation to matters of moral formation, conscience, and moral worth. It will discuss arguments that support the use of guilt and shame in cultivating moral character, as well as those that are skeptical about either the reliability of these attitudes in communicating moral norms, or their ability to achieve this end. It will look at how these reactive attitudes may or may not figure in an account of morally worthy action, as in cases involving agents like Huck Finn.

Advanced topic in philosophy of logic and language
Mr James Kirkpatrick –W. 11 (*weeks 1 to 4*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

'Our language, tiger, our language: hundreds of thousands of available words, frillions of legitimate new ideas, so that I can say the following sentence and be utterly sure that nobody has ever said it before in the history of human communication: "Hold the newsreader's nose squarely, waiter, or friendly milk will countermand my trousers." Perfectly ordinary words, but never before put in that precise order. A unique child delivered of a unique mother.' (Stephen Fry, *A Bit Of Fry And Laurie*, Series 1: Episode 3)

A unique child indeed! Philosophy of language seeks to understand the nature of meaning and how we use language to communicate with each other. This lecture series covers a number of advanced topics concerning reference and quantification not typically addressed in *Philosophy of Logic and Language* lectures, such as contemporary accounts of the meaning of proper names, pronouns and donkey anaphora, quantifier domain restriction, and generic sentences. These lectures will address the limitations of first-order predicate logic for the semantic analysis of natural language. These four lectures, open to all, may be of particular interest to undergraduate studying Philosophy of Logic and Language, Knowledge and Reality, Philosophical Logic, and Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Here is the expected schedule:

1. Proper Names
Despite the frequency of proper names in natural language, their meaning is a controversial and disputed topic among philosophy of language and linguists. This lecture explores the meaning of proper names, focusing specifically on the recent debate between referentialism and predicativism about proper names. Problematic data for both positions will be introduced and possible solutions will be scrutinised.

2. Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora
This lecture focuses on the meaning of pronouns such as 'she' and 'his'. More specifically, we explore the problems that donkey anaphora, such as the 'it' in 'Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it', poses for these theories. We shall explore description- and dynamic-based solutions to the problem.

3. Quantifier Domain Restriction
When Chad says 'Every beer is in the fridge', he obviously doesn't mean that *every* beer in the world is in the fridge. But if 'every' is analysed as a universal quantifier of first-order predicate logic, them how are the domains of quantifiers restricted in this way? This lecture examines the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction and surveys several ways that the domains of natural language quantifiers are restricted, including semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic accounts.

4. Generics
Generic sentences, such as 'Ravens are black', express generalisations about what properties are characteristic of members of certain kinds. Despite their central role in how

we communicate and reason about the world, their meaning is controversial and much-debate. This lecture examines the phenomenon of genericity as manifested in language and critically analyses a number of prominent theories of the semantics of generic sentences.

Suggested reading
– Fara, D. G. 2015. 'Names are predicates'. *Philosophical Review* 124(1): 59–117.
– Evans, G. 1977. 'Pronouns, quantifiers, and relative clauses (I)'.*Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 7: 467–536.
– Stanley, J. and Z. Szabo. 2000. `On quantifier domain restriction'. *Mind & Language* 15: 219–261.
– Leslie, S.J. (2007). 'Generics and the structure of the mind.' *Philosophical Perspectives* 21(1): 375–403.

Causation in the Law
Dr Sandy Steel (Law) and Prof Alexander Kaiserman – M. 11 – 1 (*even weeks*),
Wadham College (Knowles Room)

In these four classes, we will examine the relationship between causation and legal liability. Topics to be covered include the law's distinction between 'factual' and 'legal' causation, the concept of a 'break in the chain of causation', the possibility of non-causal forms of liability, and the role of moral luck in the law. This class is cross-listed with the Faculty of Law, but philosophy graduate students are warmly encouraged to attend. Suggested readings will be posted on Weblearn in advance of the first class.

Applied Ethics Discussion Group
Dr Rebecca Brown – Th. 2 – 4 (*even weeks*), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Interested participants should email the organiser.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems
Dr Dan Isaacson – M. W. 11, Mathematical Institute

Prerequisites:
This course presupposes knowledge of first-order predicate logic up to and including soundness and completeness theorems for a formal system of first-order predicate logic (as is covered in B1 Logic).

Course Overview:
The starting point is Gödel's mathematical sharpening of Hilbert's insight that manipulating symbols and expressions of a formal language has the same formal character as arithmetical operations on natural numbers. This allows the construction for any consistent formal system containing basic arithmetic of a 'diagonal' sentence in the language of that system which is true but not provable in the system. By further study we are able to establish the intrinsic meaning of such a sentence. These techniques lead to a mathematical theory of formal provability which generalizes the earlier results. We end with results that further sharpen understanding of formal provability.

Course Synopsis:
Gödel numbering of a formal language; the diagonal lemma. Expressibility of sets and relations in a formal language. The arithmetical undefinability of truth in arithmetic. Formal systems of arithmetic; arithmetical proof predicates. Σ_0-completeness and Σ_1-completeness. The arithmetical hierarchy; ω-consistency and 1-consistency; the first Gödel incompleteness theorem. Separability; the Rosser incompleteness theorem. Adequacy conditions for a provability predicate; the second Gödel incompleteness theorem; Löb's theorem. Provable Σ_1-completeness. The ω-rule. Provability logic GL; fixed point theorems

for GL. The Bernays arithmetized completeness theorem; undecidable Δ2-sentences of arithmetic.

Reading List:
Lecture notes for the course.

Further Reading:
1. Raymond M. Smullyan, *Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems* (Oxford University Press, 1992).
2. George S. Boolos and Richard C. Jeffrey, *Computability and Logic* (3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 1989), Chs 15, 16, 27 (pp 170-190, 268-284).
3. George Boolos, *The Logic of Provability* (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Evaluative Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism
Dr Andrew Klevan – T.5 and W.12 (*weeks 1 to 4*), English Faculty (History of the Book Room)

This series will explain and explore the aesthetic evaluation of art. The series will be of interest to students – both undergraduate and graduate – studying philosophical aesthetics and to those studying and practising criticism in the humanities. The series is oriented towards film, but is devised to be relevant to other arts (e.g. literature, fine art, music) and consists of philosophical and critical material of general applicability. It will divide into two main sections and will address the following topics:

What is Evaluative Aesthetics?

1) The Origin and Definition of Aesthetics 2) The Aesthetic Attitude 3) Aesthetic Taste 4) Sensory Immediacy 5) Aesthetic Pleasure 6) Seeking Agreement 7) Imagination 8) Aesthetic Appreciation 9) Form and Style 10) Aesthetic Qualities 11) Specificity

What is Aesthetic Criticism?

1) Evaluation 2) Understanding and Interpretation 3) Perception 4) Experience 5) Particularity and Responsiveness 6) Description and Analysis 7) Close Reading 8) Comparison, Category and Context 9) Intention, Achievement and Skill 10) Evaluative Criteria 11) Reasons, Arguments and Objectivity 12) Subjectivity, Contingency and the Relational

Graduate Classes

Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Faculty's BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s).

With the more popular graduate classes, attendance by those outside of the BPhil and MSt can cause the teaching rooms to become overcrowded. In such circumstances, BPhil and MSt students, for whom these classes are intended, must take priority. Those not on the BPhil or MSt will be expected, if asked by the class-giver(s), to leave the class for the benefit of the intended audience.

History of Philosophy Pro-Seminar
Prof Paul Lodge – F. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The *History of Philosophy Pro-seminar* will run in two groups which meet for four weeks each.

My aim with this seminar is three-fold:

1) To reflect on the nature of, and reasons for, studying the history of philosophy

2) to try to give some sense of what it is to produce successful academic work in this area, particularly work at an early stage in ones career;

3) to give students the chance to think about 1 and 2 by working through a number of publications that embody different aims and methods.

After an introductory week, we will approach aims 1 and 2 by looking at papers related to 3 topics in the philosophy of Leibniz

Week 1 - General issues concerning method
Readings:
1. 'Rules for the History of Philosophy' by Peter Adamson

2. _Philosophy and Its History: Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philosophy_ ed. Mogens Laerke, Justin E. H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser (OUP, 2013)

Introduction and Chapter 10 ('Philosophic Prophecy' by Eric Schliesser)

Readings for Weeks 2-4 TBC

Aristotle's Ethics
Prof Terence Irwin – Th. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

The aim of this class is to discuss the basis, the structure, the merits, and the defects of Aristotle's moral theory. We will draw on the following sources:
(1) The three ethical treatises in the Aristotelian Corpus: the *Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics*, and *Magna Moralia*.
(2) Later developments in the ethical theory of Aristotle's followers (the early Peripatetics).
(3) The disputes between Aristotelians and Stoics, in Cicero (*De Finibus* v) and Alexander of Aphrodisias.
(4) The commentaries and discussions from later antiquity (especially Aspasius) and the mediaeval period (especially Aquinas).

Since we can't cover every major topic in the *Ethics* in one term, we need to be selective. The choice of topics may be guided by the interests and preferences of participants. If you would like to express a preference, please contact me. If you would like to offer a brief paper (at most 15 minutes) to introduce discussion of a question relevant to the topics listed below, please contact me.

Here is a provisional list of some topics that we might try to discuss in some detail.

1. THE THREE ETHICAL WORKS
Please try to read the notes on this topic (Weblearn) before the first class.

Is Aristotle the author of all three to the same extent? What is their likely order? How did they come into being? What are the similarities and differences between them, and what light do they throw on Aristotle's theory?

2. THE ULTIMATE GOOD
In all three treatises Ethics Aristotle introduces something that he calls 'the good', 'the highest good', 'the human good', and 'happiness' (if that is a good rendering of '*eudaimonia*'). He takes all these descriptions to refer to the same thing, which he takes to be important for rightly-directed practical thought. His claims raise some questions: (1) Which is prior to which? Are goods good because they promote eudaimonia? Should we pursue eudaimonia because it is the ultimate good? Do the three works give the same answers to these questions? (2) What is the relation between eudaimonia, the good, and desire? Is eudaimonia (the good) the ultimate end because we all desire it, or because we ought to desire it? Why ought we to desire it?
Aristotle claims that happiness is in some way complete and lacking in nothing. We might take this to mean that it is an ideal condition that cannot be improved. Aristotle claims, however, that it is possible to be happy, and yet become happier, as a result of good fortune (EN i 10). If that is so, how can happiness be said to be complete?
A difficulty is sometimes taken to arise from EN x 6-8, where Aristotle allegedly identifies

happiness with theoretical study or contemplation, in contrast to the life of moral virtue. If he finally describes happiness in this way, does he introduce a basic conflict into his ethical theory? And what exactly does he say about the place of theoretical study in happiness?

3. AIMS AND METHODS IN ETHICAL THEORY
In all three works Aristotle takes his inquiry to belong in some way to the discipline that he calls 'politics' (*politikê*). He does not seem describe politics in the same way in each treatise; how important are the differences? What sorts of starting points, arguments, and conclusions are appropriate for politics? Can it reasonably claim, for instance, to discover objective moral facts?

4. VIRTUES OF CHARACTER AND INTELLECT
Aristotle distinguishes virtues of character from virtues of intellect. How is this division to be understood? Does he mean that every virtue of character is independent of every intellectual state?
In EE and EN Aristotle maintains that every virtue of character is a 'state that decides' (*hexis prohairetikê*), and in EN he maintains that the virtuous person decides on the virtuous action for its own sake. If we study Aristotle's conception of decision, as expounded in all three works, should we agree with Aristotle's claim that the correct decision is necessary for every virtue of character?
He also argues that (i) every genuine virtue of character requires *phronêsis* (prudence, intelligence), and that therefore (ii) every virtue of character is inseparable from all the others. Does he present a good case for either of these two claims, or for the connexion that he sees between them?
Aristotle sometimes says that virtue makes the end correct, and phronesis makes the means correct. What division of labour does he refer to here? Does it result in a coherent account of the virtues of character?

5. VIRTUE OF CHARACTER AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN.
What, if any, is the rationale for Aristotle's list of the virtues? Which ones are genuine virtues, and which ones simply reflect circumstances or conventions of Aristotle's own time? Are there Aristotelian virtues that we ought to deny are virtues at all? (This question is sometimes thought to arise especially about magnanimity, discussed in EN iv 3,, and in MM and EE more briefly.)
Each of the virtues is said to be a 'mean' or 'intermediate' state (*mesotês*) and to aim at a mean in feelings and actions. Is this a plausible general statement about all the virtues of character that Aristotle recognizes?
The aim of the virtues: According to Aristotle, a common feature of all the virtues of character is that they aim at the fine (*kalon*). What does this mean? What more do we learn about the virtues if we agree that they aim at the fine?

6. JUSTICE
The virtue of character that Aristotle discusses at greatest length is justice. Why does it receive such prominent treatment? Is justice, as Aristotle conceives it, an important virtue?

7. FRIENDSHIP

All three ethical treatises discuss friendship (philia) at some length. Is Aristotle right to make friendship so prominent in his ethical theory? How far does he give an adequate account of morally relevant types of concern for the interests of others? Aristotle is usually taken to be a eudaemonist, so that he takes one's own happiness or well-being (eudaimonia) to be one's supreme rational aim. Is this outlook compatible with the concern for others that is required by morality? Does he show that it actually requires such concern?

8. PLEASURE

The importance of forming the right kinds of pleasures is emphasized in the account of virtues of character. And so it is reasonable that Aristotle discusses the nature and value of pleasure at length. The three Ethics offer sharply different accounts of pleasure, but it is more difficult to say whether they say inconsistent things about it. A particular puzzle arises about the EN. Could Aristotle have intended it to include the two treatments of pleasure, in Book vii and in Book x? What would be the point of including both treatments?

9. VOLUNTARY ACTION AND RESPONSIBILITY

These questions are treated at length in all three works, and – unusually – MM and EE treat them more fully than does EN. Is anything important lost in the briefer treatment offered by EN?

Medieval Ontology
Prof Cecilia Trifogli – T. 11 – 1 (*weeks 1 to 6*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

These classes focus on the medieval debate about the ontological status of relations. The main question in this debate is whether a relation *R* between *a* and *b* is a thing in its own right, not reducible to the relata *a* and *b*, although dependent on them. I will first present and explain how medieval philosophers formulate this question within their Aristotelian metaphysical framework. I shall then examine in detail two major contrasting views: the realist view of John Duns Scotus and the reductionist view of William Ockham. The texts of Scotus and Ockham will be read in English translation.

Introductory readings:
J. E. Brower, 'Aristotelian vs Contemporary Perspectives on Relations', in: *The Metaphysics of Relations*, eds. A. Marmodoro and D. Yates, OUP 2016.
J. E. Brower, 'Medieval Theories of Relations', in: *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
M. G. Henninger, *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250-1325*, Oxford Clarendon Press 1989, pp. 1-12 (Introduction).
S. Penner, 'Why Do Medieval Philosophers Reject Polyadic Accidents?', in: *The Metaphysics of Relations*.

Hegel
Prof Mark Wrathall – F. 9 – 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In this course, we'll explore Hegel's account of mind or spirit. I will be focusing in particular on the interplay of concepts of selfhood, sociality, freedom, agency, responsibility, and time in Hegel's account of mind. We will begin by looking at the early roots of Hegel's project, and his dissatisfaction with the Kantian distinction between empirical and transcendental egos. We'll then turn to the *Philosophy of Mind* (the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the philosophic Sciences*) and corresponding sections of the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*.

Primary Texts:
G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, translated by W. Wallace & A. V. Miller, revised by M. Inwood (OUP, 2010).

G. W. F. Hegel, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, translated by T. M. Knox, revised and edited by S. Houlgate (OUP 2008)

Syllabus:

Week 1   Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge* (SUNY Press, 1977), pp. 55-96,

                Recommended background reading: Excerpts from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*:
                        "The paralogisms of pure reason," CPR A341/B399-A348/B406; A349 - A405; B406-B432
                        "The Antinomy of Pure Reason: Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas", CPR A444/B472-A451/B479
                        "Resolution of the cosmological Idea of the totality of the derivation of occurrences in the world from their causes," CPR A532/B560 - A558/B586
                "Analogies of Experience," CPR A176/B218 - A218/B265

Week 2   "Subjective Mind: Introduction and Anthropology," *Philosophy of Mind* §§377-412 / pp. 3-141

Week 3   "Subjective Mind: Phenomenology & Psychology," *Philosophy of Mind* §§413-482 / pp. 142-216.

Week 4   "Objective Mind: Right," *Philosophy of Mind* §§483-502 / pp. 217-223; "Preface & Introduction", *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*, pp. 3-52

Week 5   "Abstract Right," *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* §§34-104, pp. 53-108

Week 6   "Objective Mind: The Morality of Conscience," *Philosophy of Mind* §§503-512 / pp. 224-227; "Morality," *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* §§105-140, pp.

109-151.

Week 7   "Objective Mind: Ethical Life," *The Philosophy of Mind* §§513-552 / pp. 228-256; "Ethical Life," *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* §§141-157, pp. 151-162

Week 8   "Absolute Mind," *The Philosophy of Mind* §§553-577 / pp. 257-277

Death and Killing
Prof Jeff McMahan – M. 11 – 1 (*week 2 on*), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

In the broad areas of normative and practical ethics, there is a substantial literature on issues concerned with killing, saving, and allowing individuals to die. Contemporary philosophers have also written extensively on whether, and if so why, death is bad for those who die. The issues addressed in these two bodies of literature are connected, for the reasons why killing is normally wrong, and why it is sometimes permissible, are related – though in ways that are not well understood – to the reasons why death might be bad or good for the individual who is killed.

It is less often recognized, however, that there is a third body of literature that bears importantly on issues of death and killing – namely, the literature in population ethics. Issues in population ethics include whether individuals can be benefited or harmed by being caused to exist, whether an individual's expected well-being provides a moral reason to cause or not to cause that individual to exist, whether there is a duty to cause better-off rather than different, less well-off individuals to exist, how to weigh quality of life against the number of lives, and so on.

This seminar will explore the complex relations among issues in these three areas: death, killing, and causing individuals to exist. Among the issues we will discuss are the following:

(1) Abortion. If a foetus would, in the absence of abortion, be identical with later person who would come to have certain interests that would be satisfied, does the potential satisfaction of those possible interests count against the permissibility of abortion?

(2) Prenatal injury. If it would be permissible for a pregnant woman to have an abortion as a means of avoiding some damage to her health, would it also be permissible for her to avoid the same problem in a way that, rather than killing the foetus, would injure it, thereby causing it to have problems throughout its subsequent life, which would nevertheless be worth living?

(3) The relevance of the Non-Identity Problem to issues of killing. If we continue to follow current policies, people living a century from now will, on average, have shorter lives of lower quality because of droughts, floods, etc. If we adopt different policies, the worst of these effects will be averted. Adopting different policies would, however, alter the details of people's lives. Different people would meet and have children together, and even when the same people would have children, their children would be conceived at different times and would thus be different children. Those who will exist in a century if we adopt different policies will therefore be different from those who will exist if we continue to follow current policies. If we cause severe climate change, then, provided that those who will exist in a century will have lives worth living, our having caused climate change will not be worse *for them*, as they would never have existed had we adopted different policies.

Suppose that, to avert climate change, a group of states must fight a war to compel another state to change its policies. This would involve killing many people. But the main aim of the war, properly understood, would not be to prevent effects that would be worse for people, but to ensure that better-off people will exist in the future rather than different, less well-off people. This raises questions that have never been addressed. Can people be morally liable to be killed to prevent them from causing effects that would be worse for no one? Can the prevention of such effects be a just cause for war? How might their prevention weigh in the assessment of proportionality against harms inflicted on wrongdoers or on innocent bystanders?

(4) The killing of animals. Suppose that to cause an individual to exist with a life worth living would be good for, or benefit, that individual. It does not follow that there is a moral reason to confer such a benefit. But this kind of benefit might matter in a different way. Suppose that a farmer causes an animal to exist with a life worth living, but then kills it when it is still young. If challenged about the permissibility of killing the animal, he might reply that, in causing it to exist with a good life, he has benefited it, and that he would not have caused it to exist except to be able to sell its meat. Overall, then, what he has done was good for the animal. He might, echoing a remark by Samuel Johnson, claim that the animal was "recompensed by existence" for the harm of being killed. Some find this argument convincing. Yet no one would accept a parallel argument as a justification for causing people to exist to be later killed to provide organs for transplantation. The challenge is to discover what is wrong with the argument, or perhaps to explain why it applies to killing animals but not to killing people.

I will begin each seminar with the presentation of certain issues and arguments. Students will be invited to intervene with comments and questions, leading to open discussion.

Meta-ethics
Prof Ralf Bader – Th. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This seminar will focus on some central metaphysical issues in meta-ethics, in particular: the contrast between subjectivism and objectivism, fitting-attitude and buck-passing analyses of value, the supervenience argument against non-reductive moral realism, the idea of normative grounding, the status and role of moral principles, and the question to what extent normative ethics is independent of meta-ethics. (Readings will be posted on Weblearn.)

Philosophy of Physics
Prof Adam Caulton, Dr Owen Maroney, Dr Christopher Timpson – Th. 11 – 1, Brasenose College (Platnauer Room)

This series of classes will cover contemporary topics in the philosophy of physics, with emphasis on spacetime and thermal physics, and on the role of symmetries. The primary intended audience is MSt students in Philosophy of Physics and fourth year Physics & Philosophy undergraduates studying the Advanced Philosophy of Physics paper. Others (especially BPhil students with a Philosophy of Physics interest) are welcome. The provisional schedule is:

Weeks 1-2 Adam Caulton

Week 1 Spacetime and Dynamical symmetries
Week 2 The Hole Argument in General Relativity

Weeks 3-6 Owen Maroney

Week 3 What is statistical mechanics? Boltzmann vs Gibbs
Week 4 The reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics
Week 5 The problem of entropy and the Past Hypothesis
Week 6 Fluctuations and Maxwell's Demon

Weeks 7-8 Chris Timpson

Week 7 Black Hole Thermodynamics I: Introduction to black holes, and thermodynamic analogies for classical black holes
Week 8 Black Hole Thermodynamics II: Semi-classical black holes, Hawking radiation, and true black hole entropy

Philosophy of Science
Dr Christopher Timpson and Prof Alex Prescott-Couch – W. 11 – 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class is intended for those offering Philosophy of Science in the BPhil, for Philosophy of Physics MSt students, and for anyone else who might be interested. Some degree of background in philosophy of science will be assumed, such as might be acquired by having attended the core lectures for FHS in philosophy of science, given in Michaelmas term. In this class we will look at a range of topics in the philosophy of science in some greater depth. Topics to be covered are expected to include: local vs global arguments regarding scientific realism, Bayesian confirmation theory and the question of non-empirical support for theories (with a specific focus on recent arguments regarding the scientific status – or otherwise – of string theory in physics), and models of explanation in the sciences.

Each week, a target piece of reading will be specified, which everyone attending the class will be expected to have read and to have thought about. (See Weblearn for details of the proposed target readings, and for some background and further readings.) Classes will begin with a brief introduction to, or summary of, the target piece (or pieces), as a jumping-off point for discussion. At the first-week class, volunteers will be sought to provide these brief introductions in subsequent weeks.

Arguments against God
Prof Brian Leftow – T. 3 – 5, Schools

We will discuss (in order) the arguments from the simplicity of naturalism and the improvability of the universe, the "logical" problem of evil and free will defences, the "evidential" problem of evil and skeptical theism, and the problem of divine hiddenness. Students intending to be at the first meeting might wish to read Graham Oppy, "God," in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Metaphysics*.

Logic and the Philosophy of Logic
Prof Volker Halbach and Prof Timothy Williamson – M. 2 – 4 (*except week 3*: W. 2 – 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

At the beginning of each class we will introduce the topic by presenting an article or book chapter, which all participants will be expected to have read in advance. This will be followed by a discussion.

For links to the papers and updates please go to the web page of the class:

http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/lehre/bphil18.html

Week 1 (15 January): Kripke's Theory of Truth

We start with a classic in truth theory:

Kripke, Saul (1975), 'Outline of a Theory of Truth', Journal of Philosophy 72, 690–716. reprinted in Martin, Robert L., ed. (1984), *Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox*, Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

If you intend to go deeper into the formal theory, I recommend:

McGee, Vann (1991), *Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth*, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis and Cambridge.

Week 2 (22 January): Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth

This week we look at axiomtaziations of Kripke's theory. Various systems have been suggested. We concentrate on:

Horsten, Leon (2009), 'Levity', *Mind* 118, 555–581.

The formal background is analyzed in

Halbach, Volker and Leon Horsten (2006), 'Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth', *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 71, 677–712.

and

Halbach, Volker and Carlo Nicolai (2018), 'On the costs of nonclassical logic'. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9424-3

The account is at the basis of

Field, Hartry (2008), *Saving Truth From Paradox*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Week 3 (31 January **note new time**): Mathematical consequences of non-classical logic I

The class has to be rescheduled in this week. Please note the different time of Weds.

The main paper is:

Tim Williamson: 'Alternative Logics and Applied Mathematics',http://media.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/docs/people/williamson/appliedmaths.pdf

Week 4 (5 February): Mathematical consequences of non-classical logic II

The main paper is again:

Williamson, Tim: 'Alternative Logics and Applied Mathematics'

Week 5 (12 February): Supervaluationism and Metarules I

The main text will be the chapter on supervaluations of the following book:

Williamson, Timothy (1994), *Vagueness*, Routledge, chapter 5.

Week 6 (19 February): Supervaluationism and Metarules II

The main text will be the following paper:

Williamson, Timothy: 'Supervaluationism and Good Reasoning'

The paper will be uploaded soon.

Week 7 (26 February): The Substitutional Theory of Logical Consequence

The main text is:

Halbach, Volker (2017), 'The substitutional analysis of logical consequence', http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/pdf/consequence34.pdf

There is also a formal version:

Halbach, Volker (2017a), 'Formal notes on the substitutional analysis of logical consequence', http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0114/pdf/consf6.pdf

Week 8 (5 February): tba, probably on Yablo's paradox and circularity

Feminist Philosophy
Prof Mari Mikkola – T. 2 – 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This class provides an introduction to feminist discussions in epistemology and metaphysics. How might reason and knowledge be gendered? How might taking gender seriously shape the way we understand reality and how reality is constructed? The class examines these and related questions. Our focus will be on four specific sub-themes:
- Gender and Philosophy
- Gender and the Construction of Reality
- Gender and Being a Knower
- Gender and Knowledge Seeking Practices

We will be reading a number of key texts by feminist philosophers that deal with these themes. Authors discussed include: Sally Haslanger, Rae Langton, Elizabeth Anderson, Louise Antony, Elizabeth Lloyd and Miranda Fricker. The focus of the seminar will be on analytically-oriented feminist philosophy.

The reading for week 1 will be:

Lloyd, E. (1995) "Feminism as Method: What Scientists Get that Philosophers Don't", in *Philosophical Topics* 23 (2): 189-220.

Information about the readings for the rest of the term will be distributed during the first meeting or can be requested from me via email before the start of the term.

Perception
Prof Mike Martin – W. 4 – 6, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) *except week 1:* Colin Matthew Room

Origins of Intentionalism

This course is intended primarily for graduate students, but interested undergraduates are welcome to attend.

The aim of the course is to sketch the development of contemporary 'intentionalist' theories of sense perception at the beginning of the 1980s. The principal focus is on PF Strawson's discussions in *Individuals* and *The Bounds of Sense* and Evans's commentary on *Individuals*; but this material will be set in context.

First Week 17 January
Hints of the Modern Problem
GEM Anscombe, 'The Intentionality of Sensation', *Analytic Philosophy*, 2nd series, ed Butler

Further reading:
JL Austin, *Sense & Sensibilia*, intro + lecture one
AN Prior, *Objects of Thought*, ch. 8

PF Strawson, 'Imagination & Perception'
PF Strawson, 'Perception & its Objects', in MacDonald, ed., *Perception & Identity*, Macmillan, 1979

Second Week 24 January
Intentionalism in the 1980s
Christopher Peacocke, *Sense & Content*, Chs. 1 & 2

Further reading:
John Searle, *Intentionality*, Ch. 2
Christopher Peacocke, 'Perceptual Content', in *Themes from Kaplan*, Almog, Perry, & Wettstein
Christopher Peacocke, 'Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 2008

Third Week 31 January
Traditional Sense-Datum Theories I: Objects
GE Moore, 'Some Judgments of Perception', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1918 – 1919

Further Reading
GE Moore, 'The Refutation of Idealism', *Mind*, 1903
GE Moore, 'A Defence of Common Sense', esp Sec IV
Bertrand Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1910 – 1911
Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript, Chs. II – V

Fourth Week 7 February
Traditional Sense-Datum Theories II: Subjects
Bertrand Russell, *The Theory of Knowledge* manuscript, Ch. III

Further Reading
Bertrand Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1910 – 1911
Bertrand Russell, *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, lec. IV
Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning & Truth*, Ch. VII
Christopher Peacocke, *Sense & Content*, Chs. 5 & 6

Fifth Week 14 February
Strawson on Space
PF Strawson, *Individuals*, Ch. 2

Further Reading
David Hume, *A Treatise concerning Human Nature*, 1.4.2
MG Evans, 'Things without the Mind', *Philosophical Subjects*, ed. Van Straaten, secs. 1 & 2; *Collected Papers*

GE Moore, 'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930 – 1933', *Mind*, 1954, 1955 I and III pp. 10 – 16

<u>Sixth Week 21 February</u>
Strawson on Persons
PF Strawson, *Individuals*, Ch. 3

Further Reading
Barry Stroud, 'Transcendental Arguments', *Journal of Philosophy*, 1968
MG Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, Ch. 7

<u>Seventh Week 28 February</u>
Strawson on Private Languages
PF Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, Pt. II, part. Pp. 89 – 112

Further Reading
Jonathan Bennett, 'Strawson on Kant', *Philosophical Review*, 1968
Richard Rorty, 'Strawson's Objectivity Argument', *The Review of Metaphysics,* 1970

<u>Eighth Week 7 March</u>
Evans's Innovation
MG Evans, 'Things without the Mind', *Philosophical Subjects*, ed. Van Straaten
MG Evans, 'Molyneux's Question', *Collected Papers*

Logical Consequence and Logical Constants
Prof Alex Paseau and Dr Owen Griffiths – T. 4 – 6, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These classes in the philosophy of logic will investigate logical consequence and logical constants. We will consider these concepts from philosophical, technical and historical perspectives. The plan is as follows.

Week 1: Varieties of monism and pluralism about logical consequence
Week 2: Arguments against logical pluralism
Week 3: Formal and informal notions
Week 4: Formalisation
Week 5: Logical constants
Week 6: Infinitary logics and cardinality quantifiers
Week 7: The isomorphism-invariance account
Week 8: Problems with the isomorphism-invariance account

Regular Faculty Seminars

The programmes of the Faculty seminars are no longer included in this Lecture Prospectus, since running lists are often not settled by the time this Prospectus is published. Instead, students and Faculty members are referred to the weekly events digest, sent from the Faculty in each week of term, which includes details of each of the seminars (often with a linked abstract). Interested parties may also refer to seminars' individual webpages, where one exists.

The Faculty seminars listed here all take place in some weeks of each term of the year, at Radcliffe Humanities (either in the Ryle Room or the Lecture Room) unless otherwise indicated. The usual schedule is given as a guide, but should be checked in any term against that term's Lecture List, or the digest for the week.

Monday   **Moral Philosophy Seminar**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/moral_philosophy

Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar
Usual schedule: weeks vary; 4.30 to 6.30, Ryle Room
Webpage: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~philmath/pomseminar.html

Tuesdays   **Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar**
Usual schedule: even-numbered weeks, 5 to 7, Ryle Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/the_postkantian_seminar

Aesthetics Seminar (*Hilary Term only – not running in HT2018*)
Usual schedule: every other week, 4 to 6, Exeter College (Quarrell Room)
No webpage live at time of writing: see events digest, or contact convener (James Grant) for information

Thursdays   **Workshop in Ancient Philosophy**
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6, Ryle Room
Webpage:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy

Philosophy of Physics Seminar
Usual schedule: weekly, 4.30 to 6.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: http://www.philosophy-of-physics.ox.ac.uk/tag/thursday-seminars/

Fridays   **Jowett Society / Philosophical Society**
Usual schedule: weekly, 3.30 to 5.30, Lecture Room
Webpage: https://jowettsociety.wordpress.com/

In addition to these, there are usually "work in progress" groups, or WIPs: most commonly, the Theoretical Philosophy WIP (http://users.ox.ac.uk/~twip/), and in some terms a Mind WIP meets.